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Some Memory Plays Before the “Memory Play”
Attilio Favorini
Talk about memory has become the language through 
which we address some of our most pressing concerns. 
This is because in modernity memory is the key to 
personal and collective identity. 
—Michael S. Roth, The Ironist’s Cage: Memory, 
Trauma, and the Construction of History
In my own case the earliest childhood memories are . . . 
regular scenes worked out in plastic form, comparable 
only to representations on the stage. 
—Sigmund Freud, “Childhood Memories and Screen 
Memories”
Hysterics suffer mainly from reminiscences.
—Freud and Breuer, Studies on Hysteria1
Though comparatively neglected, memory may be reckoned as signiﬁcant as 
race, gender and class as a feature of dramatic character construction. As André 
Malraux once put it—presciently, in light of contemporary neuroscience—“One 
day it will be realized that men are distinguishable as much by the forms their 
memories take as by their characters.”2 But if dramatic criticism has largely ignored 
memory,3 memory studies have characteristically overlooked drama: excellent, 
comprehensive, and essential works such as those by Edward S. Casey and Douwe 
Draisma4 make reference to not a single play. Just as the history of drama could be 
rewritten to include memory, the history of memory could be rewritten to include 
drama. We need to establish the category of “memographers”—thinkers and writers 
about memory irrespective of discipline.
Focusing singularly on the dramatic construction of memory has the 
disadvantage of seeming to ignore the many other memory sites within theatre. 
But such concentration offers a vantage point for recognizing how dramatists have 
contributed to the conception of memory alongside philosophers and psychologists, 
as well as social and cognitive scientists. It also offers the salutary challenge to 
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seek a lingua franca for discussing a phenomenon studied from the perspectives 
of so many disciplines. So wide-ranging is memory as a phenomenon, concept, 
and term that Graham Richards, half tongue-in-cheek, notes that “it might, perhaps 
justiﬁably, be suggested that the category ‘memory’ is simply too sweeping, a 
folk-psychological term of scant scientiﬁc utility.”5 But, as with other conceptually 
complex, if ﬂawed, markers of self, memory heuristically places us on a grid whose 
coordinates are both constructed and determined. Like race6, which helps locate 
self in a context both socially constructed and ethnically determined; and gender, 
which helps locate self in a context socially constructed and sexually determined; 
and class, which locates self in a context socially constructed and economically 
determined, memory helps locate self on a continuum of characteristics socially 
constructed and both autonomically and auto-noetically determined, that is, driven 
by one’s neurocognitive proﬁle and history. We may “have” memory, but memory 
also has us: it tells us who we are.
As a “time art” (like music, dance, and literature), rather than a “space art” 
(architecture, painting, sculpture), theatre has a formal afﬁnity for memory. Murphy 
and Kovach relate the differences between “space arts,” which render an aspect of 
the world into permanent form, and time arts, which capture “the ﬂowing character 
of all temporally ordered experience” to differences in sciences, noting that the life 
sciences have shifted from the former to the latter. 7  Memory study itself reﬂects 
such a transformation. Philosophical arguments over whether human nature is 
ﬁxed (with such features as aggression, familial loyalty) or changing (what new 
motivating forces, cognitive structures, or values might we develop?); tensions felt 
in psychology between identifying typologies, drives, and instincts vs. functional, 
developmental, and environmental orientations; and the cognitive science debate 
pitting artiﬁcial intelligence models vs. evolutionary biological models for the 
human brain—all these impact on whether memory is considered a more or less 
static record of impressions and traces of the world or an adaptive and constructive 
response to it. Adopting a distinction made by Edward Casey, we may identify these 
positions as the passivist and activist memory traditions, which Casey traces back 
respectively to Aristotle and Plato.8 Theatrical renditions of memory, I contend, 
contribute to these intellectual and cultural formations. 
In order to grasp how the drama contributes to the construction of memory, 
it is necessary brieﬂy to lay out two contexts: the topography of a ﬁeld that may 
be called memory studies and the range of ways in which theatre remembers. 
The phenomenologies of memory and theatre interpenetrate one another. On the 
one hand, theatre’s fundamental mode of repetition makes it a child of memory. 
This by no means renders theatre unique among the arts—all the Muses, not just 
Thalia, are daughters of Mnemosyne, goddess of memory. Yet, theatre seems 
particularly thick with memory. From rehearsals to memory plays to theatrical 
memorabilia to theatres themselves—which constitute the exoskeleton of theatre’s 
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memory—theatre can be fruitfully contextualized as an activity of remembering. 
On the other hand, theatrical metaphors and vocabulary have historically been 
useful in modeling not just memory, but all of consciousness—Bernard J. Baars 
going so far as to assert, in a considerable exaggeration, that theatre metaphors are 
“essentially all we have” to describe mental functions.9 If theatrical enactment is 
seen as suffused with memory, remembering may also be usefully recognized as 
an exercise of scenic imagination.
Theatre and memory overlap, interweave, and commingle with one another like 
the planes in a drawing by M. C. Escher, though it cannot be denied that the study 
of memory has largely “belonged” successively to philosophical, experimental, 
clinical, and cognitive psychology. The roominess of this disciplinary home has 
“placed” memory in juxtaposition now with learning or development theory, 
now with notions of perception and imagination, therapeutics, and/or theories of 
consciousness. Thus, memory has historically been a concept that mediates between 
self and mind, consciousness and the unconscious, between identity as recorded and 
reminded and identity as constructed. But memory’s reference to the sphere of the 
already actualized also links it to the lifeworld and thus to “truth,” history, social 
formation, evolution, biology, and the neural basis of cognition. In the twentieth 
century especially, memory quit its already capacious disciplinary home for a 
nomadic existence. As a concept, memory’s traces may be found in historiography 
(the memory/history issue), philosophy (history of memory, philosophy of mind), 
and languages and literatures (memory as “theme,” poetic memory, autobiography). 
As a category of things or processes, memory suffuses religious studies (ritual 
reenactment, Holocaust studies), art history (retrospectives, inﬂuence, “Neo-” 
formations, revivals), ﬁlm studies (documentary, homage, remakes), and Medieval 
and Renaissance studies (memory arts and systems). As a store of information, 
memory occupies sociology (collective memory), law (precedent), and anthropology 
(traditional life ways, oral history). As a neurocognitive capacity, memory permeates 
a variety of ﬁelds in the physical sciences, such as evolutionary biology (memory 
faculties as naturally selected), physical education (body memory), and cognitive 
science (research on the neurophysiology of memory traces and networks, 
sometimes identiﬁed respectively as “local” and “global” orientations)—among 
others.
Obviously, then, the matrix for this disciplinary growth is not a phenomenon 
conﬁned to the individual mind. As Edward Casey eloquently demonstrates 
in the second half of Remembering (“Pursuing Memory Beyond Mind” and 
“Remembering Re-membered”), memory is embodied; it is a feature of cultural 
formation; it inheres in place; and it is socialized when undertaken with others 
in reminiscing and commemorations. Richard Dawkins’s concept of a cultural 
replicating unit he terms a “meme” (for its suggestion of both gene and memory) 
is also to the point, as is biochemist Gerald Edelman’s position that the “memory” 
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of DNA replication and the memory of the immune system in recognizing likes 
constitute “a new principle” ultimately leading to the evolutionary development 
of the mind.10 To cite further evidence of the pervasiveness of memory in human 
development—as well as memory’s archaic connection with enacted representation 
(proto-theatre)—there is Merlin Donald’s hypothesis that early hominids developed 
a “mimetic culture” prior to evolving symbolic language. Mimetic culture entails 
the invention of representational acts with the purpose of social communication; 
it is a speciﬁc form of reproductive memory subject to recall and interpretation 
and thus crucial to the modeling of social structure.11 Recent breakthroughs in 
cognitive science suggest that mimetic culture is supported by “mirror neuron” 
systems in the brain that ﬁre empathetically in observing others and “that specialize 
in carrying out and understanding not just the actions of others but their intentions, 
the social meaning of their behavior, and their emotions.”12 Memory may connect 
us, brain to brain.
As a feature of character construction, memory ebbs and ﬂows in the history 
of drama. The Greeks, who mythologically paired Mnemosyne, mother of the 
Muses, with Lesmosyne or Lethe, dramatized both memory and forgetting via 
what Aristotle called recognition. Shakespeare was equally memorious: Hamlet 
and Pericles can fruitfully be read in light of Renaissance ideas about memory. 
Then, the memory scene largely empties—just as the “passive” memory tradition 
displaces the “active”—until the end of the nineteenth century; plays whose 
situation and subject matter offer the potential for remembrance are almost bare 
of retrospection: The Rival Queens, All for Love, Fatal Curiosity, even Rip Van 
Winkle don’t look back.
In the twentieth century the trend is reversed. As Greek protagonists, whether 
in tragedy or comedy, are strong-willed problems-solvers; as Elizabethan heroes 
are essentially explorers of every social and psychological corner, even as their 
Renaissance counterparts searched the globe; as the contestants of French classical 
theatre are conﬂicted between duty and desire; as dramatic characters from the 
Romantic age are isolated above, below or outside society—modernist dramatis 
personae are natural rememberers.
Theatre of the modern era is theatre of memory. What the standard history of 
modern theatre terms a “century of innovation”13 is also a century of memoration, 
in which memory becomes a persistent and intrusive subject of the drama, as well 
as an object whose contours are shaped by the many arts of theatre. Coincidental 
with the rise and maturity of psychology as a modern life science, dramatists 
brought memory in a major role to the ﬁeld of play; aptly enough, at just about the 
same time, modern thinkers about memory discovered the theatrical metaphor as 
explanatory model. The concept of a “scene” that frames and/or enables a system 
of cognition encompassing both perception and memory was as indispensable to 
Freud at the beginning of modernism as it is today, post modernism, as evident in 
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Bernard Baars’s “theater model” for consciousness and Gerald Edelman’s assertion 
that in cognition “the world can be correlated and bound into a scene,”14 which 
carry over Freud’s metaphor from psychology to cognitive science. In each case, 
the implication is that the mind frames, organizes, and highlights self and non-self 
experience as the playwright constructs the unit of action. But whether the seeker 
of the source of consciousness is a philosopher, a psychologist, or a playwright, 
the modernist path towards understanding self and subjectivity goes through the 
forest of memory.
Modernist memographers though disparate in their approaches are united by 
their goal of attempting to reckon the ongoing inﬂux of the past into the present 
and to determine the way in which, as evolved, psychological, and socio-cultural 
beings, we are utterly past-inﬂected. The sciences of memory, then, are a feature of 
modernism, and Ian Hacking is correct in asserting that the “systematic attempt to 
uncover facts [emphasis mine] about memory” begins “only late in the nineteenth 
century.”15 Freud’s development of psychoanalysis as prolonged anamnesis;16 
Bergson’s success in freeing memory from pure mentalism, in grounding memory 
in matter and registering how “the past survives as a bodily habit”;17 Stanislavsky’s 
delivery of the tool of emotional memory into the hands of actors; T. S. Eliot’s 
insistence that the poet must live “not merely [in] the past, but the present moment 
of the past” and that “the historical sense involves a perception not only of the 
pastness of the past, but of its presence”;18 Maurice Halbwachs’s insight that 
“We preserve memories of each epoch in our lives, and these are continually 
reproduced; through them, as by a continual relationship, a sense of our identity 
is perpetuated”;19 F. C. Bartlett’s comprehension of memory as an evolutionary 
adaptation to the challenge of dealing with absent objects experienced in the past, 
and his recognition of the “mark” of remembering as when an agent “acts as if it 
were being predominately determined by some distant event in its history, using 
this directly to help it solve some immediate problem”20—such propositions as 
these originate from no single intellectual viewpoint, however fortuitously they 
may all feed a mainstream of thought that thematizes memory in discourses of the 
self, the mind, and the lived world.
The diverse disciplinary passages negotiated by memographers are distinguished 
by landmark publications21 in many ﬁelds. As the ﬁeld of psychology (a term that 
did not come into common English usage until the nineteenth century) itself divided, 
both the experimental and clinical wings could lay claim to memory. On the clinical 
side, Théodule Ribot’s Les Maladies de la Mémoire (1881) and Pierre Janet’s 
L’Automotisme psychologique (1889) entail elaborate description and classiﬁcation 
of amnesias connecting memory loss or forgetfulness with neurotic symptoms. 
Freud and Breuer’s Studies on Hysteria (1895; English tr. 1909) builds on Janet and 
relates memory to affect and repression, while Freud’s “Childhood Memories and 
Screen Memories” (1907; English tr. 1914 in Psychopathology of Everyday Life) 
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and “Remembering, Repeating and Working Through” (1914; English tr. 1924) 
taxonomize true and false recollections. Jung’s “La Structure de l’inconscient” 
(1916; revised and published in English as The Relations between the Ego and the 
Unconscious in Two Essays on Analytical Psychology [1928]) creates a new blend of 
clinical psychology and cultural anthropology, which posits archetypes as a species 
of genetically shared memories. On the experimental side, William James’s The 
Principles of Psychology (1890) undertakes an almost phenomenological analysis 
of the act of remembering and binds memory to physiology. More theoretically, 
the bodily basis of memory is explored in Bergson’s Matter and Memory (1896; 
English tr. 1911) and Richard Semon’s The Mneme (1904; English tr. 1921), which 
theorizes the “engram” as the brain’s record for a remembered event. Bridging 
psychology and sociology, Maurice Halbwachs’s The Social Frameworks of 
Memory (1925; English tr. 1992) and The Collective Memory (posthumous, 
unﬁnished, 1950; English tr. 1950) emphasized the impact of social pressure on 
the implantation of memories.  F. C. Bartlett took stock of both Halbwachs and 
Jung to test whether their hypotheses were compatible with experimental protocols 
in Remembering: A Study in Experimental and Social Psychology (1932), which 
put forth revolutionary ideas on memory systems and shifted focus from memory 
trace to memory process. The pioneering developmental psychologist Jean Piaget’s 
The Language and Thought of the Child (1923; English tr. 1926), Judgment and 
Reasoning of the Child (1924; English tr. 1928), The Child’s Conception of the 
World (1926; English tr. 1929), and Memory and Intelligence (1973) furthered the 
idea that through memory “there is a continuous reciprocity—the mind taking its 
shape from interaction with the outer world, with which it carries on perpetual 
commerce.”22  A. R. Luria’s Mind of a Mnemonist (1968, based on studies begun 
in the 1920s) attempts to link neurophysiological function and personality via the 
examination of the case of a prodigious hypermnemonist. Distant from psychology, 
and deploying a range of concepts and practices relevant to how writers remember, 
T. S. Eliot’s “Tradition and the Individual Talent” in Sacred Wood (1920) and, of 
course, Proust’s À la recherche du temps perdu (1913-27; English tr. commencing 
1922) compel a rethinking of the relationship of the creative act to the literary and 
personal past. Such manifold approaches derive from the nature of memory as a 
multifold phenomenon whose complexity has been fully recognized only in the 
twentieth century.
To the extent that the range of discipline and methodology represented in the 
books cited above conﬁnes memory to the system of mentation, however, they may 
diminish a full appreciation of its ubiquity in the material world—in the body, in the 
earth, in matter itself. Indeed, much work on memory from the 1880s to the 1920s 
labors to overcome the traditional dualism whose eventual attrition allows modern 
psychology to develop. While all of the models for memory alluded to above might 
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instructively be juxtaposed with those of modernist playwrights, I offer here only 
a case study largely circumscribed by the rise of modern clinical psychology.
  
Janet, Freud, Ibsen, Strindberg: Case Studies
Without ignoring the tributaries of thought represented in the propositions and 
publications I have outlined here, it may nevertheless be granted that the mainstream 
of modern memory studies springs from psychology. Thus, it will be necessary 
to survey, if only from the bankside, some of the roiling disputes formative of the 
modern discipline, while striving to avoid submersion in the “mad weir of tigerish 
waters”—a Louis MacNeice line quoted in the epigraph to Graham Richards’s 
critical history of psychology. Let me merely indicate at the outset that the new ideas 
psychology was compelled to integrate affected how memory was thought about. 
Evolution led such thinkers as Henri Bergson, Richard Semon, and Théodule Ribot23 
to wonder about memory development as adaptive behavior. Advances in brain 
research and various conceptions of the unconscious or subconscious as theorized 
by Charcot, Janet, Freud, and Jung eventually contribute both to a taxonomy of 
types of memory (working memory, semantic memory, collective memory, episodic 
memory, etc.) and to a new interest in amnesia—an interest made more urgent by 
the effects of shock and trauma experienced by combatants in the First World War. 
The veridicality and reliability of memory come under scrutiny from perspectives 
as divergent as psychoanalysis and forensic psychology. Finally, as Richards points 
out, theories of race invite speculation on how a collective past may be inscribed 
on autobiographical memory.24
Among memographers at the turn of the nineteenth century Pierre Janet and 
Sigmund Freud emerge as a natural pairing, like Ibsen and Strindberg, by virtue 
of the intermingling of their ideas and techniques. Edward Casey’s brief historical 
survey of the history of memory makes Freud and Janet modern heroes, largely 
responsible for the revival of the “activist” memory tradition.25 Placing the surge of 
interest in memory in a more speciﬁc cultural context, Ian Hacking sees the period 
1874-86 in France as “the span of time when the structure of the modern sciences of 
memory came into being,” when “a new science, a purported knowledge of memory, 
quite self-consciously was created in order to secularize the soul.”26 Crucially, it 
is at the end of this period that Freud goes to Paris and becomes directly familiar 
with the work of Charcot and Janet.
Until the “memory wars” of the 1990s pitted advocates of recovered memory 
and false memory syndrome against each other, Janet had been largely forgotten as 
a pioneer of modern psychology. As both Hacking and Janice Haaken have pointed 
out, the memory wars to some extent replayed the opposition of Janet and Freud on 
the etiology of dysfunction and hysteric symptoms in trauma: the former holding 
to the position that “something happened” (the recovered memory position), the 
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latter allowing for a false or screen memory obscuring, disguising, or otherwise 
intruding itself between a rememberer and a repressed experience.27 
The relationship of Janet and Freud is complex, and I will engage it only to 
ﬂesh out the memory scene at the turn of the century. Initially, Janet and Freud were 
in agreement that hysterics were marked by traumatic incidents that had become 
unconscious to one degree or another, but not “forgotten”—Janet citing Freud and 
Breuer favorably in The Mental State of Hystericals (1894) and they citing him 
frequently in Studies on Hysteria (1895).28 Subsequently, Freud and Janet became 
disaffected over who deserved the major credit for positing the unconscious.29 
Whether or not one agrees with Daniel Robinson that “Janet all but invents the 
concept of unconscious motivation,”30 his theory of hysteria remained more 
cognitive than psychoanalytic. Lacan thus faults Janet for equating the ego with 
“the perception-consciousness system” and takes him to task for keeping a lofty 
distance from his case histories that, according to Lacan, prevented him from hearing 
the unsaid in their symptoms.31 Where Janet theorizes dissociation, “the mind’s 
capacity . . . to separate off from normal consciousness a traumatic memory trace,” 
Freud theorized repression, which might entail concealing a guilt-producing fantasy. 
Haaken sees these two approaches ultimately as emphasizing an external (Janet) 
vs. an internal or intrapsychic (Freud) source for distress, though in any case, both 
dissociation and repression entail unconscious forgetting.32 According to Hacking, 
Janet located the origin of trauma in a sort of depersonalized state (something 
happened), while Freud saw trauma originating in a human intention or action that 
may not be identical with what is “remembered” (something happened).33 Though 
Freud disparaged Janet for ﬁnding a “constitutional”—i.e., body-based—cause for 
hysteria,34 Janet’s physiological orientation looks more prophetic in the light of 
cognitive science and the turn of psychiatry towards biology and pharmacology. 
Casey, Haaken, and Hacking, as is typical of so many writers on memory, make 
no reference to theatre, and so they do not notice that contemporaneous with Janet 
and Freud, Ibsen and Strindberg constructed memory as dynamically operative in 
character formation. In my understanding, Freud and Ibsen also shared a method 
of considering characters as case studies that makes comparing the psychologist 
and the playwright a rich exploration. Clearly, when Freud wrote about Ajax, 
Philoctetes, Richard III, Hamlet, or Lady Macbeth, 35 he was studying their “cases,” 
and this was particularly so of what he had to say about Ibsen’s characters. I want 
to suggest here that Ibsen himself took a clinical attitude towards his characters, 
not only the most familiar cases of the troubled Rebecca West (to whom Freud 
devoted a seven-page analysis)36 and Mrs. Alving (whom Ibsen displays against 
the glass wall of the conservatory as if she were in an operating theatre or under a 
bell jar), but especially Irene in When We Dead Awaken,  certainly Ibsen’s clearest 
case of what the era would call hysteria.37  
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In the late 1890s, or about the time Freud embarked on his self-analysis, paying 
particular attention to the signiﬁcance of fragmentary memories,38 Ibsen was at work 
on his tiresome and brilliant last play. When We Dead Awaken recapitulates many 
themes and motives from earlier Ibsen—the artwork as child, the irreconcilability 
of sexual desire and love, the artist tempted to impossible heights—and so to tease 
out a single theme is reductive but I trust forgivable in the immediate context. When 
We Dead Awaken shows Ibsen in a profoundly “ruminescent” (Casey’s coinage for 
reminiscent and rumination) mode, particularly if one accepts the identiﬁcation of 
the sculptor Rubek with the playwright and Irene with Ibsen’s wife Suzannah.39
In singling out memory, I follow up to a point the clearly marked footsteps 
of Oliver Gerland, whose suggestive article in Modern Drama linked certain 
features of the plot of When We Dead Awaken to the psychological theories of 
Janet.40 Gerland makes a strong case that Janet and Ibsen were both exploring the 
disruptions of traumatic memory and that both dramatist and psychologist concluded 
that a failure to integrate a traumatic event into a life narrative can be associated 
with the repetition of the trauma. I want to add here that Ibsen’s subtle analysis 
of the etiology of Irene’s hysteria and Rubek’s discontent bears at least as much 
resemblance to Freud’s views on remembering and forgetting.
In the ﬁrst act we meet the world-famous sculptor Rubek and his far younger 
wife Maja at the Norwegian seaside resort where they encounter Irene,41 Rubek’s 
former model, whom he initially claims not to remember. In the following two acts, 
which take place in the mountains, as Maja is lured off by the bear hunter Ulfheim, 
Rubek and Irene reestablish a relationship as fraught with misunderstanding and 
discrepancy as it had been in the past. For Gerland, the key incident in the play 
occurs when the two are grouped momentarily like the sculptor’s masterpiece The 
Resurrection Day. He makes the neat point that the sculpture has ﬁxed or frozen 
a traumatic memory which, as in cases reported by Janet, triggered obsessive 
behavior: “The Resurrection Day group is an emblem of Irene and Rubek’s traumatic 
history, both its product and its abstract . . . [;] located within its conﬁnes, Irene 
and Rubek . . . are possessed by the traumas of their past just like Janet’s patients 
at the Saltpêtrière.”42 But, Gerland allows, the sculpture group may also be thought 
of in Janetian fashion as a recollection rather than a repetition. This would permit 
their encounter to be interpreted as therapeutic, for it enables them “to build their 
relationship anew.”43 They may both perish virtually as double suicides in the 
famous or infamous avalanche at the end (so adroitly managed with white satin 
sheeting in Robert Wilson’s production), but even so, Gerland contends, their death 
is accompanied by Maja’s song of freedom, lending an “irreducible ambivalence” 
to what Ibsen had to say about the past.44
While I agree that “Janet posits two kinds of memory—narrative and 
traumatic—associated with two modes of expressing memory—recollection and 
reenactment,”45 I am not sure that Gerland has parsed out how the creation of the 
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sculpture grouping represents differing—and different kinds of—memories for 
Rubek and Irene. Furthermore, Gerland does not address forgetting in the play—an 
odd omission in light of Janet’s renowned writing on amnesia.46 Finally, I suggest 
it is Freud rather than Janet who describes memory “scenes” of the sort Gerland 
shows Ibsen is constructing. 
Gerland’s account of the plot and his linking of Ibsen to Janet sideline key 
elements that complicate how Ibsen constructs personal or autobiographical 
memory.47 Gerland downplays how differently Irene and Rubek have dealt with the 
memory of their relationship and de-emphasizes Irene’s psychotic behavior, as she 
drifts wraith-like and confused amidst the scenery. In Ibsen’s description of Irene 
“her features are stiff and immobile; her eyelids are lowered, and her eyes seem to 
stare unseeingly. . . . She walks with stiff and measured steps,”48 Ferguson  connects 
Irene’s stiff way of walking to Suzannah’s rheumatism, but I wonder if it isn’t meant 
to be a hysterical symptom similar to what afﬂicted the case of Fräulein Elisabeth 
Von R., who “walked with the upper part of her body bent forward,” and who 
was easily fatigued from walking.49 Irene’s other symptoms—social dysfunction, 
paranoia causing her to carry a knife with which she secretly threatens Rubek, and 
what may or may not be delusions of killing her husband and children—suggest 
dementia praecox (subsequently termed schizophrenia), one of the new diagnoses 
that eventually replaced the catch-all category of hysteria.50 
Irene is truly locked into repetitive behavior. Ever since parting from Rubek, 
she has wandered in search of him, evidently wreaking havoc on surrogates of both 
the artist and his art—the sculpture she insistently calls “our child.” She “posed 
as a naked statue in peep shows” in a sordid repetition of her modeling for Rubek. 
The dagger she now carries with her is another repetition, a surrogate for the sharp 
needle she concealed in her hair, to fend off the touches of Rubek she both dreaded 
and desired, but which never came. This troubling arousal is surely meant to be 
one source of the hysteria she later lives out. Another source is an incident Irene 
recounts that went unremarked by Rubek when it happened, but has changed her 
life. As their artist-model relationship came to a close Rubek summed it up to Irene 
as a “delightful episode,” a characterization that irredeemably demeaned it in her 
eyes. This double diminution—sexual and social—constitutes the trauma she has 
spent her life trying to exorcize. 
By contrast, Rubek has found a way of working through their relationship, 
which Irene has not, and her reappearance emphasizes how different their lives have 
been. In the ﬁrst act, he initially denies to Maja that the woman in white whom he 
has spied is his former model, and he subsequently tells Maja that he had forgotten 
Irene long ago, claiming that he can forget “extremely easily . . . when I want to” 
(emphasis Ibsen’s).51 In the second act, we learn details of his ability to “forget” that 
both substantiate and belie it. After the departure of Irene, Rubek in fact reconﬁgured 
the sculpture, making it a larger grouping to include “the cracked and heaving earth” 
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and a swarm of “women and men—as I knew them in life.” Irene, who had been the 
sole ﬁgure, is now placed in the middleground of a group. That is, Rubek acted to 
accommodate the memory of Irene in a larger, living, and changing context, while 
Irene ﬂed, her attempts to exorcize the traumatic relationship only causing her to 
cling to it, repeating the past. The change in the sculpture signiﬁes, even literalizes, 
the fact that Irene and Rubek have different memories of their relationship. Ibsen’s 
point is not only that their “reminiscences” are divergent, but that Rubek’s active 
refashioning of their relationship is productive and in some sense therapeutic, while 
her passive clinging to the memory is pathogenic: it is while Rubek recounts the 
remaking of the sculpture that Irene comes closest to stabbing him. Though the 
Rubek we meet in the play is far from happy, he has continued to create and has 
moved on in his life, incorporating Irene as an “episode” in it. He has sublimated 
his bitterness and sadness in the animal liknesses he has concealed in the portrait 
busts he sculpts on commission. He has also transferred to Maja the inspirational 
function formerly Irene’s.
As the descriptive vocabulary of the previous two paragraphs suggest, I propose 
that the psychological analogues to the divergent ways of constructing memory 
engaged in by Rubek and Irene are not to be found in Janet, but in two of Freud’s 
classic essays, “The Aetiology of  Hysteria” (1896), published while Ibsen was 
at work on When We Dead Awaken, and “Remembering, Repeating and Working 
Through,” ﬁrst published in 1914.52  Freud declares in the earlier essay that the 
symptoms of hysteria “are determined by certain experiences of the patient’s which 
operate traumatically and are reproduced in his psychic life as memory-symbols 
of these experiences.”53 “Memory-symbols” are not true memories, necessarily, 
but may be constructs that have to be penetrated to get the patient to focus on the 
originating traumatic scene. In the later essay, Freud makes clear that therapeutic 
remembering, which disentangles the remembered situation from the present one, 
disposes of the patient’s compulsion to repeat, and frees him for the next stage in 
his life. In the play, Rubek’s revision of the sculpture is literally a remembering in 
order to forget, a reconstruction of the memory of Irene, putting their experience 
in a different psychological place in his life. Though Rubek may not have fully 
worked through his resistances, and seems rather to be arrested in what Freud 
called a  “‘transference-neurosis’ . . . an intermediate region between illness and 
real life,”54 for Rubek as for Freud, remembering is, therapeutically speaking, an 
“auxiliary of forgetting.”55 But Irene can make no such adjustment and, in the 
third act, demonstrates her repetitive behavior in the ways already noticed, but 
also by confusing in her mind the scene of her traumatic parting with Rubek at the 
Taunitzer See years ago with the conversation they had just the day before. The 
inability to distinguish past from present is for Freud and Janet alike the surest sign 
of pathology and explains one of the epigraphs for this article: “Hysterics suffer 
mainly from reminiscences.” Her disturbed and disturbing recollection comes just a 
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page before Irene and Rubek are buried in the avalanche and makes it very difﬁcult 
to interpret their entire reunion—psychologically—as anything but the seduction 
of Rubek into the world of Irene’s dementia. 
A further distinction needs to be made concerning Irene’s behavior, which is 
different from the sorts of unconscious reenacting of a forgotten traumatic incident 
that Janet describes and Gerland cites.56 Where Janet recounts unconscious or 
trance-like reenactments, Freud describes repetitions, which are acted out as a 
result of repression: the patient reproduces “what he has forgotten and repressed . . . 
not as a memory but as an action; he repeats it, without, of course, knowing 
that he is repeating it.” What the patient repeats are not memories but symbols 
of memories that display his “inhibitions and unserviceable attitudes and his 
pathological character-traits.”57 The symbols are linked into “memory-chains” that 
lead “infallibly . . . to the realm of sexual experience” in childhood.58 While I hasten 
to add that neither Janet’s nor Freud’s case studies precisely describe Irene—who 
has not repressed the memory of her troubling attraction to Rubek—the sexual 
source of her hysteria certainly evokes Freud. She may not have been a child when 
subject to the sexual feelings she could not cope with, but both her vulnerability 
and youth are emphasized in the text. We are told she left her family and home to 
go with Rubek, a decision she characterizes as her “childhood’s resurrection.”59
It perhaps needs to be explicitly stated that the foregoing takes no stand in the 
dispute between the partisans of Freud and those of Janet over who discovered the 
unconscious, nor on the validity of psychoanalysis, nor on Freud’s controversial 
abandonment of the “seduction theory.”60 For my purposes, it is ﬁtting enough to 
notice that Janet and Freud agreed that various kinds of “nervous” disorders were 
characterized by pathogenic reminiscence, that hysterical symptoms could be tied 
to amnesia, and that forgotten phenomena “are not entirely destroyed; they are not 
inactive; they continue to act either to increase the amnesia or diminish it,” to quote 
Janet.61 At the same time, a more dynamic and complex conception of the workings 
of memory that includes notions like memory-symbol, repression, transference, 
and sublimation was shared by Freud and Ibsen, but not by Janet: 
You will now see in what it is that the difference lies between our 
view and Janet’s. We do not derive the psychical splitting from an 
innate incapacity for synthesis on the part of the mental apparatus; 
we explain it dynamically, from the conﬂict of opposing mental 
forces and recognize it as the outcome of an active struggling on 
the part of the two psychical groupings against each other.62
 
What Freud here calls “psychical splitting” and Janet called dissociation are 
notions that may have both sprung from the single source of French psychology 
in the period of 1874-86, as Hacking asserts,63 but their division had profound 
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implications. The Janetian tributary channeling trauma, amnesia, dissociation, and 
therapeutic hypnotism ﬂowed underground for decades, only to resurface in the 
era of multiple personalities, recovered memory, and “alternative” therapies.64 The 
Freudian stream of fantasy, repression, and the talking cure long ago overﬂowed its 
banks to ﬂood modern culture. Hacking draws a further distinction: Freud, unlike 
Janet, thought that a cure could occur only if a patient was made to deal with the 
Truth; by contrast, Janet was willing to hypnotize his patients into thinking a trauma 
never occurred. Hacking concludes that 
In the matter of lost and recovered memories, we are the heirs 
of Freud and Janet. One lived for truth, and quite possibly 
deluded himself a good deal of the time and even knew he was 
being deluded. The other, a far more honorable man, helped his 
patients by lying to them, and did not fool himself that he was 
doing anything else.65 
Ethical judgments aside, Freud’s way was also Ibsen’s, or, more properly, 
vice versa. The psychologization of trauma and the problematizing of memory 
were crucially formative of modern drama before Freud put pen to paper. The 
popular premise of modern melodrama in which the soul of one is taken over by a 
“Svengali” (Trilby was published in 1894) is similarly continuous with the motif 
of controlling “alters” in accounts of multiple personality disorder like Sybil66 and 
compatible with the ideas of Janet. It is no accident that Robert Louis Stevenson 
corresponded with Janet when writing Dr. Jekyll and Mr. Hyde or that Strindberg 
in writing Miss Julie was likely inﬂuenced by the ideas of the great therapeutic 
hypnotist Hyppolyte Bernheim, whom Janet championed.67
Ibsen was to write no more plays and died on March 26, 1906. Very soon 
thereafter, his contemporary Strindberg began work on the chamber plays, 
completing all four in a burst of creativity in 1906 and 1907. If Ibsen wrote his 
last two plays with Strindberg’s portrait on his wall, Strindberg likewise wrote in 
the shadow of Ibsen, whom he both deprecated and revered.68 Of the four chamber 
plays, The Burned House69 is most haunted by the memory of several Ibsen plays, 
but especially Ghosts.  In constructing a plot that features a disreputable gardener, 
a ﬁre exposing family secrets and an insurance payment not made, was Strindberg 
subconsciously trying to burn down Ibsen’s house and extirpate his memory? Or was 
he, in writing about a brother who returns to the home of his childhood, recognizing 
his Ibsenian origins? Biographical implications aside, The Burned House offers 
great riches to the student of memory, for in returning an adult to his childhood 
home Strindberg has created a scene of great “memorial potency.”70 
While the characters in When We Dead Awaken can be measured by whether 
they succeed or fail in putting the past behind them, the impulse to sort out the 
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autobiographical past is scarcely the sole motivation of the characters of Burned 
House, for whom memory is social as much as personal, deconstructive as much 
as recollective-constructive. Burned House thus surveys a far greater segment of 
the topography of memory, as recognition, reminding, reminiscence (frequently 
divergent), body memory, and place memory crowd Strindberg’s scene.
Such a congeries of contested, fragmented, and unreliable memory was 
magniﬁcently unpacked by Freud in “Childhood Memories and Screen Memories,” 
written—intriguingly enough—at exactly the same time (the early months of 
1907) that Strindberg was working on Burned House. Freud deﬁnes a screen 
memory as an apparently inconsequential memory that interposes itself between 
the rememberer and the repressed content. It is of course coincidental but no less 
intriguing that Freud’s autobiographical case study for screen memory bears striking 
similarities—in its details of a thieving nurse, an older brother, and a disappearing 
mother—to an incident in Strindberg’s play. Apparently, the dramatist and the 
scientist, independently and simultaneously, developed remarkably similar ways 
to describe the dynamics of childhood memory. 
In Strindberg’s plot, a suspicious ﬁre has destroyed the home of the Dyer 
Rudolph Valstrom, whose family has occupied it for generations. The burned 
house and its furnishings are the central scenic element. Suspicion of arson falls 
upon the Student, who received free board in exchange for tutoring the family’s 
young children. Someone had locked all the doors and taken the keys, making the 
ﬁre harder to put out, and an Inspector is investigating. The businesses of others 
in the neighborhood are affected, including a Gardener and a Tavern Owner who 
cater to the adjoining cemetery. The characters are almost always thus referred to 
by their trade (as the Stonecutter, Painter, etc.) rather than by name.
Arriving on the scene is a Stranger, subsequently identiﬁed as the Dyer’s 
younger brother Arvid, who had left for America thirty years before. Though Arvid 
had never claimed his share of the family’s inheritance, he has now returned, so he 
says, only to “ﬁnd the house of my childhood again.”71 As Arvid encounters ﬁgures 
from his past, a pattern of what might be called anti-reminiscence emerges, in which 
the conversants have divergent memories that disillusion or destroy commonality. 
The Painter, for example, remembers Arvid testing him for color blindness and 
preventing his entrance to art school. When Arvid defends his decision, the Painter 
reveals it wasn’t that as a child he couldn’t distinguish colors, only that he didn’t 
know their names. When Arvid meets Mrs. Vesterlund, Rudolph’s former nursemaid, 
they exchange contradictory memories of her husband. For a third example, years 
ago the Stonecutter had testiﬁed in a paternity suit that Arvid fathered a child, but 
now Arvid reveals that he was not the father, and merely stood forward to support 
the child because he was fond of her mother. The Stonecutter becomes deeply 
anguished over having given false witness, inﬂuenced by rumors. Reminiscence, 
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normally indulged to establish community, is here put in the service of its opposite, 
as divergent memories are deployed to destroy an imagined commonality. 
The agon of memory and counter-memory is chieﬂy played out by the two 
Valstrom brothers, however, directly in front of the ruins of their childhood. 
Confronted both by Arvid’s revelations and the material evidence of double house 
walls exposed by the ﬁre, Rudolph is compelled to recognize that the family fortune 
derived from smuggling rather than the dyeworks, which metaphorically enough 
disguised their true activities. In another telling exchange, Arvid and Rudolph each 
remember separately ﬁnding the memoirs of Casanova72 behind the sermons in 
their father’s bookcase, but while Rudolph takes this casually (“You too?”), Arvid 
follows up his memory almost directly with the revelation of his attempted suicide 
by hanging himself in the closet at age twelve. Further details come to us in snap-
shots or freeze frames from a visualized narrative accessible only in fragments—a 
name carved in a door, hiding in the garden, a sawed-off tree branch—like the 
reminiscentia strewn among the ruins of the house: a child’s book, a piece of a 
portrait frame, the end of a bedstead, a clock that falls to pieces when Arvid touches 
it. Where we see only fragments, however, Arvid perceives a pattern. “No matter 
how life shaped itself, I’ve always found some connection with the past, or some 
repetition,” he says. “There are scenes in my life that have occurred many times. . . . 
Finally life came to seem like a play that was being staged especially for me.”73 
Only in retrospect can we piece together what Arvid means. Accepting a sort of 
psychic determinism, Arvid understands that he has continued to play out in his 
life his contentious relationship with his brother. Similarly, accused unjustly of 
seducing another’s wife, he accepted the role, just as he accepted that his family’s 
illegitimate business would continue to brand him.
Most of the brothers’ conﬂicting and conﬂictual memories are associated, 
one way or another, with care-giving women: their mother, the nursemaid Mrs. 
Vesterlund, and their stepmother. The circumstances here are difﬁcult to determine, 
as the brothers’ conversation seems to proceed almost by free association, with 
denial frequently blocking the way. In the essay on childhood memories quoted 
in my epigraph, Freud similarly returns to childhood incidents whose signiﬁcance 
initially deﬁes interpretation, but which are recalled so vividly that he is compelled 
to call them “regular scenes” and “comparable only to representations on the stage.” 
Chief among these is a memory Freud dates to his third year, in which he is standing 
in front of a cupboard and screaming some demand. His older half-brother holds 
the cupboard door open. Then his mother, looking beautiful and slim, walks into 
the room. Freud adds that contemporary with this memory were dreams about 
his nurse, which included such inconsequential details as his handing over small 
coins to her.74
Freud’s interpretation of the memory and the attendant dreams was aided by 
information he gleaned as an adult from his mother. During the time his mother was 
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“in conﬁnement,” that is, pregnant with his younger sister, the nurse was removed 
from the house and indicted on charges of theft lodged by his older brother. As a 
child, Freud understood vaguely that his older brother had something to do with the 
disappearance of the nurse. When he asked him where she went, his older brother 
ﬂippantly remarked that she was “boxed up” or as we might say in English “put 
away.” When his mother as well disappeared in conﬁnement, he demanded that 
his brother open the place, the cupboard, where things were put away. Freud adds 
“I now understand, too, why in the translation of this visual childhood scene my 
mother’s slimness was emphasized: it must have struck me as having just been 
restored to her” after pregnancy.75 Freud ﬁnishes by observing in a footnote that 
the cupboard was likely a symbol of his mother’s womb and that the child of three 
might have suspected his older brother of somehow placing the child inside it.
The Stranger Arvid’s memories of his mother are both more detailed and less 
coherent than Freud’s. We note at the outset that only Arvid mentions his mother 
at all, and there are no corroborating or corrective memories from other characters. 
His initial memory of his mother is not triggered by someone else mentioning her, 
but by his older brother mentioning the name of his nursemaid, Mrs. Vesterlund, 
who now owns the adjoining tavern called “The Cofﬁn Nail.” This is the same Mrs. 
Vesterlund whom Arvid subsequently reports “robbed us blind for ten years.” Her 
name touches off in Arvid a vivid motor memory of the pressure on his chest of the 
heavy nursery air, of his brother attempting to smother him, of beatings and ﬂights 
to the garden. Still mystiﬁed as an adult at this treatment, Arvid muses elliptically 
“but she was my mother.” While the context might suggest that Arvid is referring 
to the surrogate Mrs. Vesterlund, we are twice told, by Rudolph and Arvid, that she 
was the older brother’s nursemaid, not Arvid’s. It is, then, a maternal absence rather 
than a presence that Arvid associates with his painful memories. The association 
angers Rudolph: “Be quiet!” he warns. “Well, you were the favorite, you could 
do no wrong,” Arvid answers, “Then we got a stepmother. . . . Her father was a 
professional pallbearer.”76
As the scene continues, Arvid adds a few other maternal details. Their Mother 
(capital “M” in the text) praised Rudolph’s swimming ability over Arvid’s and she 
favored unripened pears from the orchard that the children loathed. (Arvid does 
not suspect, as Freud certainly would have, that the memory of pears screens the 
image of a mother’s breasts, though “unripened,” i.e., not offering milk.77) Finally, 
the only other mention of their birth mother comes very near the end of the play, 
when it is revealed that Rudolph has cheated his brother of his inheritance, and 
Arvid taunts him with “You’re my mother’s son after all.”78 
It is difﬁcult to make sense of these details in isolation. Other of Arvid’s 
memories and recollections associated only indirectly with his mother add 
perspective, however. The same interview with his brother that yields Arvid’s 
memories of his mother and Mrs. Vesterlund also features the account of his 
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attempted suicide after reading Casanova. Arvid further reports that when he awoke 
from the death-like sleep following his hanging, he had “forgotten most of my 
previous life and had to begin a new one. You all thought me very queer.” Then 
in the abrupt, transitionless manner in which their conversation proceeds, Arvid 
asks his brother “Have you remarried?” Rudolph responds that he has a wife and 
children, and the subject is immediately dropped. Now we already know from the 
gossip of the tradespeople that Rudolph’s ﬁrst wife “ran away”79 and that his second 
wife had been his children’s governess. Not unexpectedly, Strindberg is drawing on 
some autobiographical detail. His mother Eleonora, bore a child, Strindberg’s elder 
brother, when she and Strindberg’s father were betrothed, but not married. When 
Strindberg’s mother died (he had just turned thirteen), Strindberg’s father remarried 
within a year. His second wife had been the children’s governess.80 In any case, 
that Arvid raises the issue to his brother in the context of remembering their own 
childhood points us to a central question raised implicitly rather than explicitly in 
the text: what happened to the birth mother of Arvid and Rudolph? 
What I make of all this is what Freud might have. Arvid’s remembering 
Mrs. Vesterlund’s thievery, put together with Arvid’s accusation that Rudolph 
treacherously is “my mother’s son,” and with other seemingly inconsequential 
memory fragments, constructs a wall of screen memories interposing themselves 
between Arvid and repressed content. Like the child Freud, Arvid associated a 
thieving nurse with the disappearance of his mother. Like Freud, Arvid had an 
elder brother who stood as a rival for his mother’s affections. There may also be 
a similar sexual subtext suggested in the circumstances that led to Arvid’s suicide 
attempt, and I offer the interpretation that Arvid has repressed the information that 
his mother, like Rudolph’s wife, ran away, perhaps because his childhood sensibility 
made him think that he and his brother had somehow caused their mother’s departure 
with their lustful thoughts inspired by the memoirs of Casanova. 
Early in their interview, Arvid reminds Rudolph that as children they would 
“read” the ashes of the ﬁreplace, and that they can do the same now with the ruins of 
the burned house, and that is exactly what Strindberg has them do and certainly what 
Freud would have them do. Already in “Aetiology of Hysteria,” Freud had compared 
recovery of repressed memories to combing through the ruins of an ancient palace.81 
The Valstrom house may have had double walls and locked doors—Freud’s screen 
memories—but they can neither fully conceal nor contain the past. In the embers 
of deep retrospection, the most intimate memories are illuminated—perhaps even 
more to the discerning spectator than to Arvid, who prides himself on his “excellent 
memory.” The pile of furnishings atop which Arvid spies the family album is an 
ash heap of memories displaced, ransacked, destroyed. Arvid twice addresses the 
ruins as “house of my childhood,” which for Strindberg as for Freud is a landscape 
of vividly remembered scenes and shadowy amnesias.82
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It is perhaps of more than passing interest that Freud himself leaves us an 
interesting example of the technique I have applied to Strindberg in his interpretation 
of an apparently insigniﬁcant childhood recollection in Goethe’s autobiography, 
Dichtung und Wahrheit. Freud notes that Goethe remembers only one incident 
from his early childhood, recorded in a page-long account of being mischievously 
encouraged by three young friends to toss piece after piece of newly-bought 
crockery through a window into the road and enjoying the merry sound of their 
being smashed to bits. Freud recounts his own extended puzzlement over the 
parsimony of the incident in yielding insight into the great man, until he recognized 
the incident as a screen memory. Freud’s understanding of Goethe was enhanced by 
encountering in his patients memories of breaking items by tossing them through 
a window as associated with feelings of resentment over the birth of a sibling. 
Though he had harbored an intuition about the Goethe incident, it wasn’t until 
Freud’s analysand produced a compact narrative linking information about the 
imminent birth, witnessing a primal scene of his parents, and throwing brushes and 
shoes through a window into the street, that Freud “threw all doubts to the winds. 
When in analysis two things are brought out one immediately after the other, as 
though in one breath, we have to interpret this proximity as a connection.” Noting 
that just before the crockery incident Goethe reveals that he barely survived his 
birth, Freud also discovered through research that four of Goethe’s siblings failed 
to survive childhood and that one, Hermann Jakob, died somewhere close to the 
time of the crockery episode. As was the case with Freud’s analysand, Goethe’s 
hurling of objects out the window was displaced aggression originating in rivalry 
with his brother. Freud’s gloss is that Goethe’s memory in effect declares “I was a 
child of fortune: destiny had preserved me for life although I came into the world 
for dead. Even more, destiny removed my brother, so that I did not have to share 
my mother’s love with him.”83  In Burned House there is a similar concatenation 
of fraternal rivalry and a retrospective act of destruction; the heap of destroyed 
objects presumably hurled through the gaping wreckage of the house are symbols 
of resentment as palpable as Goethe’s broken dishes. It is of interest that four of 
Strindberg’s siblings did not survive childhood, that his mother bore four more 
surviving children after August’s birth, and that the close conﬁnes of his childhood 
ﬂat would have made it almost inescapable that he witnessed a primal scene.84
The Burned House, like the constructions of the classical memory arts, 
stands as a powerful example of the intimacy of memory and place. In developing 
analogies between place and memory, Casey notes that the duration of a “scene” 
at a remembered place serves as a sort of temporal horizon, and that horizon-like 
phenomena pervade the phases and modes of memory. Strindberg’s play is rife with 
the phenomena. What Casey calls “aura,” the blurred fringe or margin of what is 
remembered, is virtually reiﬁed in the charred walls of the burned house. Various 
characters encounter the same phenomenon in reminding, where it is manifested as 
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“the outer edge of the adumbrated remindand,” as when the Gardener’s reminder 
to fetch a bouquet disappears in a mist of associations; in recognizing, where it is 
manifested as the “limits of the perceptual suffusion,”85 as when the Old Woman 
just fails to recognize the Stranger, who looks like his brother but is taller; and in 
reminiscing (the beginning and ending of the reminisced-about event), as when the 
Painter’s memory of the testing of his color sense begins where Arvid’s ends.
Such delimitations mark what might be termed the internal horizons of 
Strindberg’s memory scenes. The external memory horizons86 of The Burned House 
allow us to locate it among contemporary dramatic constructions of memory such 
as Ibsen’s, psychological constructions such as Freud’s, and antithetically (if not 
unexpectedly) among classical and medieval constructions. Strindberg’s absorption 
with medievalism (as in his alchemical experiments) is reﬂected in the play’s 
allegorical infrastructure—recurring images of the expulsion from Eden—and in 
the mansion-like, central scenic image of a house gutted by ﬁre and visited by a 
succession of neighbors and tradesmen. Just as medieval plays may be linked to 
the device of the memory palace, in that stage pictures served as memoranda or 
emblems of virtuous situations, the burned house may be Strindberg’s image of 
a trashed memory palace, both anti-memorial and anti-catechismal.87 The play is 
oddly like the medieval morality play The Castle of Perseverance deconstructed. 
The world-traveling Stranger may have arrived on a memorial pilgrimage to “ﬁnd 
the house of my childhood again,” but he leaves as a stand-in for objectifying 
history, abandoning memory in the ruins. 
If Ibsen and Strindberg may be said to have raised the curtain on the modernist 
memory scene, they did not lack for followers. Between them and the eponymous 
“memory play,” The Glass Menagerie, Luigi Pirandello, Eugene O’Neill, Robert 
Sherwood, and Thornton Wilder, not to mention the lesser lights who wrote the 
hugely popular Peter Ibbetson, Forever After, and I Remember Mama, all crafted 
memory plays that can usefully be placed next to the memory constructions of Jung, 
Halbwachs, William James, Bartlett, and T. S. Eliot. The memory scene of the early 
twentieth century is far more crowded than has hitherto been recognized.
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